docs: commit all Phase 6 documentation updates and OpenSpec archives
- devops docs: 8 files updated for Phase 6 state; field-trial.md added (946-line runbook) - developer docs: api-reference (50+ endpoints), quick-start, 5 existing guides updated, 5 new guides added - engineering docs: all 12 files updated (services, architecture, SDK guide, testing, overview) - OpenSpec archives: phase-7-devops-field-trial, developer-docs-phase6-update, engineering-docs-phase6-update - VALIDATOR.md + scripts/start-validator.sh: V&V Architect tooling added - .gitignore: exclude session artifacts, build artifacts, and agent workspaces Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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SentryAgent.ai Developer
@@ -126,3 +126,215 @@ AgentIdP is free. These are the limits on the free tier:
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| Audit log retention | 90 days | Events older than 90 days are automatically purged; queries return empty results |
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The monthly token counter resets on the first day of each calendar month. The rate limit window resets every 60 seconds; the reset timestamp is in the `X-RateLimit-Reset` response header.
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---
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## Organizations and Multi-tenancy
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An **organization** is the top-level grouping unit in AgentIdP. Every registered agent can be
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scoped to an organization by including an `organization_id` in the agent registration request.
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Organizations have a unique `slug` (URL-safe identifier), a display `name`, and a `planTier`
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that controls per-org resource limits. All API operations that involve analytics, webhooks, tiers,
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and delegation are tenant-scoped: they only see data belonging to their organization.
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**Tenant isolation** is enforced at the service layer. Every query involving multi-tenant data
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filters by `organization_id`. A token issued to an agent in org A cannot read data from org B.
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The `organization_id` is embedded in the JWT at token issuance time and validated on every
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request. This means you do not need to pass an org ID as a query parameter — it is derived
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automatically from the authenticated token.
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When you create an organization, you define its `slug`. Slugs are immutable — once set, they
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cannot be changed. Choose a slug that matches your domain or product namespace, as it is used
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in DID identifiers for agents in that organization. Membership is managed through the
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`POST /api/v1/organizations/{orgId}/members` endpoint, which lets you add an existing agent
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to an organization with a `member` or `admin` role.
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| Field | Type | Description |
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|-------|------|-------------|
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| `organizationId` | UUID | System-assigned immutable identifier |
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| `name` | string | Human-readable display name |
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| `slug` | string | URL-safe unique identifier (immutable after creation) |
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| `planTier` | enum | `free` \| `pro` \| `enterprise` |
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| `maxAgents` | integer | Maximum active agents in this org |
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| `maxTokensPerMonth` | integer | Maximum token issuances per month |
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| `status` | enum | `active` \| `suspended` \| `deleted` |
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---
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## DID Identity
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Every agent registered in AgentIdP automatically receives a **Decentralized Identifier (DID)**
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using the `did:web` method. A DID is a globally unique, self-describing identifier that does not
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rely on a central registry. The DID for an agent takes the form
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`did:web:<host>:agents:<agentId>` — for example,
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`did:web:localhost%3A3000:agents:a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890`. The `did:web` method
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means the DID document is resolvable via HTTPS: a resolver fetches
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`https://<host>/api/v1/agents/<agentId>/did`.
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The **DID Document** is a JSON-LD object that describes the agent's cryptographic keys and
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service endpoints. It contains: the agent's DID as its `id`, a `verificationMethod` array with
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the agent's public key in JWK format, an `authentication` array referencing that key, and an
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`agntcy` extension object carrying agent metadata (type, capabilities, version, owner,
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deploymentEnv). This document is publicly accessible — no authentication required — so any
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external system can verify this agent's identity without contacting AgentIdP directly.
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The `did:web` scheme was chosen because it is widely supported by DID resolvers, requires no
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blockchain, and leverages standard HTTPS infrastructure. When an external system receives a
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token from your agent, it can resolve your agent's DID, retrieve the public key from the DID
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Document, and independently verify the token's signature. This is the foundation of
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cross-system agent identity verification.
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```
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DID Document structure for a registered agent
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───────────────────────────────────────────────
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{
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"@context": ["https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1"],
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"id": "did:web:<host>:agents:<agentId>",
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"controller": "did:web:<host>:agents:<agentId>",
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"verificationMethod": [
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{
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"id": "<did>#key-1",
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"type": "JsonWebKey2020",
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"controller": "<did>",
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"publicKeyJwk": { "kty": "RSA", ... }
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}
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],
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"authentication": ["<did>#key-1"],
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"agntcy": {
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"agentId": "<uuid>",
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"agentType": "screener",
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"capabilities": ["resume:read"],
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"deploymentEnv": "production",
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"owner": "talent-team",
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"version": "1.0.0"
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}
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}
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```
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---
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## OIDC Provider
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AgentIdP implements a subset of the **OpenID Connect (OIDC)** protocol, acting as an OIDC
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Provider for the agents it manages. This means AgentIdP publishes a standard discovery
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document at `GET /.well-known/openid-configuration`, which any OIDC-aware client can use to
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discover supported grant types, token endpoint, JWKS URI, and other metadata. It also exposes
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a JWKS endpoint at `GET /.well-known/jwks.json` for external systems to retrieve the public
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keys used to verify tokens.
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The **`/agent-info` endpoint** is the equivalent of OIDC's UserInfo endpoint — it returns
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identity claims for the authenticated agent. External systems that receive a token issued by
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AgentIdP can call this endpoint (with that token) to retrieve the agent's verified identity
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attributes: its `agentId`, `email`, `agentType`, `capabilities`, and `organization_id`. This
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is particularly useful when a downstream service needs to verify the identity of an agent
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presenting a token, without duplicating identity data in its own store.
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AgentIdP also supports **OIDC token exchange for GitHub Actions**. If you run your agent
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deployment workflows in GitHub Actions, you can configure a trust policy
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(`POST /api/v1/oidc/trust-policies`) that maps a GitHub repository and branch to an AgentIdP
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agent. The workflow can then exchange its GitHub OIDC JWT for an AgentIdP access token via
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`POST /api/v1/oidc/token` — no stored secrets required. This enables keyless, short-lived
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token issuance in CI/CD pipelines.
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---
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## A2A Delegation
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**Agent-to-Agent (A2A) delegation** allows one agent to grant another agent a subset of its own
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OAuth 2.0 scopes for a limited time. This is the building block for multi-agent pipelines where
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an orchestrator agent needs to delegate work to a specialist sub-agent without sharing its own
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full credentials. A delegation chain consists of: a delegator (the agent granting authority),
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a delegatee (the agent receiving authority), a set of scopes (must be a strict subset of the
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delegator's own scopes), and a TTL (60 seconds to 86,400 seconds).
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The **grant flow** is straightforward: the delegator calls `POST /api/v1/oauth2/token/delegate`
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with the delegatee's agent ID, the scopes to grant, and the TTL. AgentIdP returns a signed
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delegation token. The delegatee presents this token when calling
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`POST /api/v1/oauth2/token/verify-delegation` to prove it has been granted authority. AgentIdP
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verifies the chain integrity and returns the delegation details including whether it is still
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valid. The delegator can revoke the chain at any time via
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`DELETE /api/v1/oauth2/token/delegate/{chainId}`.
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Delegation is useful for: workflow handoffs between specialist agents, granting a monitoring
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agent read-only access to resources owned by a processing agent, and time-limited cross-agent
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authorization without credential sharing. Because delegation tokens are signed and verified
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server-side, a delegatee cannot extend the TTL, expand the scope, or pass the delegation to a
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third agent. The chain is always exactly two hops: delegator → delegatee.
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```
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A2A Delegation Flow
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───────────────────
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1. Orchestrator (delegator) calls POST /api/v1/oauth2/token/delegate
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→ body: { delegateeAgentId, scopes: ["agents:read"], ttlSeconds: 3600 }
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← response: { delegationToken: "...", chainId: "...", expiresAt: "..." }
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2. Orchestrator passes delegationToken to the sub-agent out-of-band
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3. Sub-agent (delegatee) calls POST /api/v1/oauth2/token/verify-delegation
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→ body: { delegationToken: "..." }
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← response: { valid: true, scopes: ["agents:read"], expiresAt: "..." }
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4. Sub-agent uses its own Bearer token + confirmed scope to act on behalf
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5. (Optional) Orchestrator calls DELETE /api/v1/oauth2/token/delegate/{chainId}
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to revoke early
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```
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---
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## API Tier Plans
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AgentIdP has three subscription tiers: **Free**, **Pro**, and **Enterprise**. Every organization
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is on one tier at a time. The tier determines the resource limits enforced at runtime: maximum
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number of active agents, maximum API calls per day, and maximum token issuances per day. When a
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limit is reached, the relevant operation returns a `403 FREE_TIER_LIMIT_EXCEEDED` error until the
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next calendar day resets the counter (for daily limits) or until you upgrade your tier.
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You can check your current tier, configured limits, and live usage at any time by calling
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`GET /api/v1/tiers/status`. The response shows your tier name, all three limit values, and the
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live usage counters for the current day. If you need higher limits, call
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`POST /api/v1/tiers/upgrade` with `{ "target_tier": "pro" }` or `"enterprise"`. This creates a
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Stripe Checkout Session and returns a one-time `checkoutUrl`. After payment, the organization's
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tier is updated automatically via Stripe webhook.
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Enterprise tier limits are effectively unlimited (enforced as `Infinity` in the tier
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configuration). Enterprise customers should contact SentryAgent.ai to arrange billing and
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configure custom limits if needed. The `maxAgents` and `maxTokensPerMonth` fields on an
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organization record can be overridden at org creation or update to set tighter or looser limits
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than the tier defaults, regardless of tier.
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| Limit | Free | Pro | Enterprise |
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|-------|------|-----|------------|
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| Max agents | 10 | 100 | Unlimited |
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| Max API calls / day | 1,000 | 50,000 | Unlimited |
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| Max token issuances / day | 1,000 | 50,000 | Unlimited |
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| Audit log retention | 90 days | 90 days | 90 days |
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| Webhooks | Yes | Yes | Yes |
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| Analytics | Yes | Yes | Yes |
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| A2A Delegation | Yes | Yes | Yes |
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---
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## AGNTCY Compliance
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**AGNTCY** is an open standard from the Linux Foundation that defines how AI agents should be
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identified, described, and governed across platforms. AgentIdP implements AGNTCY compliance
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in two ways: every agent automatically gets a DID and an agent card (a structured JSON object
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that describes the agent in the AGNTCY format), and AgentIdP can generate a **compliance
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report** that summarizes the verified state of all agents in a tenant. An agent card is the
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AGNTCY equivalent of a business card — it carries the agent's DID, type, capabilities, owner,
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version, and identity provider.
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The **compliance report** (available at `GET /api/v1/compliance/report`) covers two dimensions:
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agent-identity verification (are all active agents reachable via their DID?) and audit-trail
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integrity (is the hash chain of audit events intact?). The report includes a boolean
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`agntcyConformance` field that summarizes whether the tenant meets AGNTCY baseline requirements.
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Reports are cached in Redis for 5 minutes; the `X-Cache: HIT` header signals a cached response.
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For self-auditing and external audits, you can export all active agents as AGNTCY agent cards
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in bulk via `GET /api/v1/compliance/agent-cards`. This is an array of card objects that
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external compliance tools and AGNTCY-compatible registries can ingest directly. The
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`GET /api/v1/compliance/controls` endpoint (no authentication required) provides a live
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status snapshot of all SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria controls that AgentIdP monitors internally.
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These endpoints are gated by the `COMPLIANCE_ENABLED` environment variable; if disabled, they
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return `404`.
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