Files
sentryagent-idp/src/services/OAuth2Service.ts
SentryAgent.ai Developer fd90b2acd1 feat(phase-3): workstream 6 — SOC 2 Type II Preparation
Implements all 22 WS6 tasks completing Phase 3 Enterprise.

Column-level encryption (AES-256-CBC, Vault-backed key) via EncryptionService
applied to credentials.secret_hash, credentials.vault_path,
webhook_subscriptions.vault_secret_path, and agent_did_keys.vault_key_path.
Backward-compatible: isEncrypted() guard skips decryption for existing
plaintext rows until next read-write cycle.

Audit chain integrity (CC7.2): AuditRepository computes SHA-256 Merkle hash
on every INSERT (hash = SHA-256(eventId+timestamp+action+outcome+agentId+orgId+prevHash)).
AuditVerificationService walks the full chain verifying hash continuity.
AuditChainVerificationJob runs hourly; sets agentidp_audit_chain_integrity
Prometheus gauge to 1 (pass) or 0 (fail).

TLS enforcement (CC6.7): TLSEnforcementMiddleware registered as first
middleware in Express stack; 301 redirect on non-https X-Forwarded-Proto
in production.

SecretsRotationJob (CC9.2): hourly scan for credentials expiring within 7
days; increments agentidp_credentials_expiring_soon_total.

ComplianceController + routes: GET /audit/verify (auth+audit:read scope,
30/min rate-limit); GET /compliance/controls (public, Cache-Control 60s).
ComplianceStatusStore: module-level map updated by jobs, consumed by controller.

Prometheus: 2 new metrics (agentidp_credentials_expiring_soon_total,
agentidp_audit_chain_integrity); 6 alerting rules in alerts.yml.

Compliance docs: soc2-controls-matrix.md, encryption-runbook.md,
audit-log-runbook.md, incident-response.md, secrets-rotation.md.

Tests: 557 unit tests passing (35 suites); 26 new tests (EncryptionService,
AuditVerificationService); 19 compliance integration tests. TypeScript clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-31 00:41:53 +00:00

363 lines
12 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* OAuth 2.0 Token Service for SentryAgent.ai AgentIdP.
* Issues, introspects, and revokes RS256 JWT access tokens.
*/
import { TokenRepository } from '../repositories/TokenRepository.js';
import { CredentialRepository } from '../repositories/CredentialRepository.js';
import { AgentRepository } from '../repositories/AgentRepository.js';
import { AuditService } from './AuditService.js';
import { VaultClient } from '../vault/VaultClient.js';
import { IDTokenService } from './IDTokenService.js';
import { EventPublisher } from './EventPublisher.js';
import { EncryptionService } from './EncryptionService.js';
import {
ITokenPayload,
ITokenResponse,
IIntrospectResponse,
IOAuth2ErrorResponse,
} from '../types/index.js';
import {
AuthenticationError,
AuthorizationError,
FreeTierLimitError,
} from '../utils/errors.js';
import { signToken, verifyToken, decodeToken, getTokenExpiresIn } from '../utils/jwt.js';
import { verifySecret } from '../utils/crypto.js';
import { v4 as uuidv4 } from 'uuid';
import { tokensIssuedTotal } from '../metrics/registry.js';
const FREE_TIER_MAX_MONTHLY_TOKENS = 10000;
/** Result of a token issuance, including either a success response or OAuth2 error. */
export interface IssueTokenResult {
success: boolean;
response?: ITokenResponse;
error?: IOAuth2ErrorResponse;
httpStatus?: number;
}
/**
* Service for OAuth 2.0 Client Credentials token issuance, introspection, and revocation.
*/
export class OAuth2Service {
/**
* @param tokenRepository - Repository for token revocation and monthly counts.
* @param credentialRepository - Repository for credential lookup and verification.
* @param agentRepository - Repository for agent status lookup.
* @param auditService - The audit log service.
* @param privateKey - PEM-encoded RSA private key for signing tokens.
* @param publicKey - PEM-encoded RSA public key for verifying tokens.
* @param vaultClient - Optional VaultClient for Phase 2 credential verification.
* @param idTokenService - Optional IDTokenService; when provided and `openid` scope
* is requested, an OIDC ID token is appended to the token response.
* @param eventPublisher - Optional EventPublisher. When provided, token.issued and
* token.revoked events are published as webhooks and Kafka messages (fire-and-forget).
* @param encryptionService - Optional EncryptionService. When provided, encrypted
* `secret_hash` values are decrypted before bcrypt verification (SOC 2 CC6.1).
*/
constructor(
private readonly tokenRepository: TokenRepository,
private readonly credentialRepository: CredentialRepository,
private readonly agentRepository: AgentRepository,
private readonly auditService: AuditService,
private readonly privateKey: string,
private readonly publicKey: string,
private readonly vaultClient: VaultClient | null = null,
private readonly idTokenService: IDTokenService | null = null,
private readonly eventPublisher: EventPublisher | null = null,
private readonly encryptionService: EncryptionService | null = null,
) {}
/**
* Issues a signed RS256 JWT access token via the OAuth 2.0 Client Credentials grant.
* Validates client credentials, checks agent status, enforces 10k monthly limit,
* and writes an async fire-and-forget audit event.
*
* @param clientId - The agent UUID acting as client_id.
* @param clientSecret - The plain-text client secret.
* @param scope - Space-separated OAuth 2.0 scopes requested.
* @param ipAddress - Client IP for audit logging.
* @param userAgent - Client User-Agent for audit logging.
* @returns The token response with access_token, token_type, expires_in, scope.
* @throws AuthenticationError if the client credentials are invalid.
* @throws AuthorizationError if the agent is suspended or decommissioned.
* @throws FreeTierLimitError if the monthly token limit is reached.
*/
async issueToken(
clientId: string,
clientSecret: string,
scope: string,
ipAddress: string,
userAgent: string,
): Promise<ITokenResponse> {
// Look up the agent
const agent = await this.agentRepository.findById(clientId);
if (!agent) {
void this.auditService.logEvent(
clientId,
'auth.failed',
'failure',
ipAddress,
userAgent,
{ reason: 'agent_not_found', clientId },
);
throw new AuthenticationError('Client authentication failed. Invalid client_id or client_secret.');
}
// Find active credentials for the agent and verify secret
const { credentials } = await this.credentialRepository.findByAgentId(clientId, {
status: 'active',
page: 1,
limit: 100,
});
let credentialVerified = false;
for (const cred of credentials) {
const credRow = await this.credentialRepository.findById(cred.credentialId);
if (credRow) {
// Check expiry before attempting secret verification
if (credRow.expiresAt !== null && credRow.expiresAt < new Date()) {
continue;
}
let matches: boolean;
if (credRow.vaultPath !== null && this.vaultClient !== null) {
// Phase 2: verify against Vault-stored secret
// vault_path may be encrypted — decryption is not needed here since
// verifySecret uses agent/credential IDs to locate the Vault entry.
matches = await this.vaultClient.verifySecret(
clientId,
credRow.credentialId,
clientSecret,
);
} else {
// Phase 1: verify against bcrypt hash.
// Decrypt the stored hash if EncryptionService is configured and the
// value appears to be encrypted (backward-compat for pre-encryption rows).
let secretHash = credRow.secretHash;
if (
this.encryptionService !== null &&
this.encryptionService.isEncrypted(secretHash)
) {
secretHash = await this.encryptionService.decryptColumn(secretHash);
}
matches = await verifySecret(clientSecret, secretHash);
}
if (matches) {
credentialVerified = true;
break;
}
}
}
if (!credentialVerified) {
void this.auditService.logEvent(
clientId,
'auth.failed',
'failure',
ipAddress,
userAgent,
{ reason: 'invalid_client_secret', clientId },
);
throw new AuthenticationError('Client authentication failed. Invalid client_id or client_secret.');
}
// Check agent status
if (agent.status === 'suspended') {
void this.auditService.logEvent(
clientId,
'auth.failed',
'failure',
ipAddress,
userAgent,
{ reason: 'agent_suspended', clientId },
);
throw new AuthorizationError('Agent is currently suspended and cannot obtain tokens.');
}
if (agent.status === 'decommissioned') {
void this.auditService.logEvent(
clientId,
'auth.failed',
'failure',
ipAddress,
userAgent,
{ reason: 'agent_decommissioned', clientId },
);
throw new AuthorizationError('Agent is decommissioned and cannot obtain tokens.');
}
// Check monthly token limit
const monthlyCount = await this.tokenRepository.getMonthlyCount(clientId);
if (monthlyCount >= FREE_TIER_MAX_MONTHLY_TOKENS) {
throw new FreeTierLimitError(
'Free tier monthly token limit of 10,000 requests has been reached.',
{ limit: FREE_TIER_MAX_MONTHLY_TOKENS, current: monthlyCount },
);
}
// Issue the token
const jti = uuidv4();
const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
const expiresIn = getTokenExpiresIn();
const payload: Omit<ITokenPayload, 'iat' | 'exp'> = {
sub: clientId,
client_id: clientId,
scope,
jti,
organization_id: agent.organizationId ?? 'org_system',
};
const accessToken = signToken(payload, this.privateKey);
// Increment monthly count (fire-and-forget)
void this.tokenRepository.incrementMonthlyCount(clientId);
// Audit event (fire-and-forget — do not await for latency)
const expiresAtDate = new Date((now + expiresIn) * 1000);
void this.auditService.logEvent(
clientId,
'token.issued',
'success',
ipAddress,
userAgent,
{ scope, expiresAt: expiresAtDate.toISOString() },
);
// Instrument: count successful token issuances
tokensIssuedTotal.inc({ scope });
// Publish event (fire-and-forget)
void this.eventPublisher?.publishEvent(
agent.organizationId ?? 'org_system',
'token.issued',
{ agentId: clientId, scope, jti },
);
const tokenResponse: ITokenResponse = {
access_token: accessToken,
token_type: 'Bearer',
expires_in: expiresIn,
scope,
};
// OIDC: append id_token when the `openid` scope was requested and IDTokenService is wired
const scopeList = scope.split(' ');
if (scopeList.includes('openid') && this.idTokenService !== null) {
const claims = await this.idTokenService.buildIDTokenClaims(agent, clientId, scope);
tokenResponse.id_token = await this.idTokenService.signIDToken(claims);
}
return tokenResponse;
}
/**
* Introspects a token per RFC 7662.
* Always returns 200; check the `active` field for validity.
* Scope enforcement (`tokens:read`) is handled upstream by OPA middleware.
*
* @param token - The JWT string to introspect.
* @param callerPayload - The decoded payload of the calling agent's token.
* @param ipAddress - Client IP for audit logging.
* @param userAgent - Client User-Agent for audit logging.
* @returns The introspection response.
*/
async introspectToken(
token: string,
callerPayload: ITokenPayload,
ipAddress: string,
userAgent: string,
): Promise<IIntrospectResponse> {
try {
const payload = verifyToken(token, this.publicKey);
const revoked = await this.tokenRepository.isRevoked(payload.jti);
if (revoked) {
void this.auditService.logEvent(
callerPayload.sub,
'token.introspected',
'success',
ipAddress,
userAgent,
{ targetJti: payload.jti, active: false },
);
return { active: false };
}
void this.auditService.logEvent(
callerPayload.sub,
'token.introspected',
'success',
ipAddress,
userAgent,
{ targetJti: payload.jti, active: true },
);
return {
active: true,
sub: payload.sub,
client_id: payload.client_id,
scope: payload.scope,
token_type: 'Bearer',
iat: payload.iat,
exp: payload.exp,
};
} catch {
// Token is invalid or expired — return inactive per RFC 7662
return { active: false };
}
}
/**
* Revokes a token per RFC 7009.
* Idempotent — revoking an already-revoked or expired token returns success.
* An agent may only revoke its own tokens.
*
* @param token - The JWT string to revoke.
* @param callerPayload - The decoded payload of the calling agent's token.
* @param ipAddress - Client IP for audit logging.
* @param userAgent - Client User-Agent for audit logging.
* @throws AuthorizationError if the caller tries to revoke another agent's token.
*/
async revokeToken(
token: string,
callerPayload: ITokenPayload,
ipAddress: string,
userAgent: string,
): Promise<void> {
// Decode the token without verification to extract claims
const decoded = decodeToken(token);
if (decoded !== null) {
// Only the token owner can revoke their own token
if (decoded.sub !== callerPayload.sub) {
throw new AuthorizationError('You do not have permission to revoke this token.');
}
// Add to revocation list
const expiresAt = new Date(decoded.exp * 1000);
await this.tokenRepository.addToRevocationList(decoded.jti, expiresAt);
void this.auditService.logEvent(
callerPayload.sub,
'token.revoked',
'success',
ipAddress,
userAgent,
{ jti: decoded.jti },
);
// Publish event (fire-and-forget)
void this.eventPublisher?.publishEvent(
callerPayload.organization_id ?? 'org_system',
'token.revoked',
{ jti: decoded.jti },
);
}
// If token is malformed/undecoded, per RFC 7009 we still return success
}
}